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Nassiri v. Chiropractic Physician’s Bd. 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (Apr. 3, 2014)1
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – STANDARD OF PROOF
Summary
The Court determined two issues: 1) whether NRS 233B.135 of the Nevada
Administrative Procedure Act sets out a standard of judicial review or a standard of proof, and 2)
what standard of proof is required for state agencies in adjudicative hearings in the absence of a
specific statutory mandate.
Disposition
NRS 233B.135 only sets forth a standard of judicial review. The standard of proof in an
administrative adjudication is determined by the standard set out in the agency’s governing
statutes. In the absence of a specific statutory mandate, the standard can be no less than the
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
Factual and Procedural History
Appellants, Drs. Obteen Nassiri and Edward Johnson, were licensed chiropractic
physicians in Nevada, with Johnson working as Nassiri’s employee. Johnson later purchased the
practice from Nassiri. An insurance company reported that Nassiri and Johnson may have
engaged in unprofessional conduct, leading the Chiropractic Physicians’ Board of Nevada to file
complaints for disciplinary action, charging them with unlawfully referring patients to other
physicians, unlawful fee splitting, inaccurate record keeping, fraud, and employing unregistered
assistants. After considering “substantial, credible, reliable, and probative evidence,” the Board
found that Nassiri and Johnson had violated multiple provisions of NRS 634 and NAC 6342.
Nassiri and Johnson petitioned for district court judicial review, arguing that the Board
used the wrong standard of proofin violation of their equal protection and due process rights.
The district court affirmed all the substantive issues now on appeal, concluding that the Board’s
determinations “must be supported by substantial evidence because NRS Chapter 634 does not
set forth a specific standard of proof.” Appellants appealed.
Discussion
Standard of Review
Factual determinations of administrative agencies are reviewed for clear error “in view of
the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record,” or for an “abuse of
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The Board revoked Nassiri’s license, ordered him to pay 80 percent of the Board’s fees and costs, fined him $5,000
for each violation, and prohibited him from owning any interest in a chiropractic practice until he regains his license.
The Board suspended Johnson’s license for one year with conditions ordered him to pay 20 percent of the Board’s
fees and costs, fined him $1,000 for each violation, and ordered probation for three years to begin once the
suspension was lifted.
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discretion.”3 Factual findings are only overturned if they are not supported by substantial
evidence, meaning evidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequately supporting the
conclusions. 4 The Court decides purely legal issues de novo, without deference to the agency’s
conclusions of law.5
Standard of proof at administrative agency proceedings
Appellants claimed that the Board improperly used the “substantial evidence” standard
from NRS 233B.135 to determine Nassiri and Johnson committed professional misconduct.
Appellants asserted that the NRS standard is lower than that used to discipline medical doctors,
and the incongruity is unconstitutional. The Court disagreed, noting the Appellants
misunderstood the concept of “standard of proof,” first by mistaking it with “burden of proof”
and second, with “standard of review.” The Court explained the “substantial evidence standard”
in NRS 233B.135 is a standard of judicial review7, not of fact-finding. Under this standard, the
reviewing court must determine whether the fact-finder made its decision based on sufficient,
worthy evidence by looking at the quality and quantity of the evidence. NRS 233B.135’s
standard of review applies to courts’ secondary review and not to the determinations of
administrative agencies.
The Court then clarified that the standard of proof in administrative adjudications should
be the standard set out in the agency’s governing statutes.9 The Court noted that in prior
decisions where governing statutes provided no standard, it has held that the correct standard was
the “general civil standard,” i.e., the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.11 Therefore, as the
governing statutes here provided no standard of proof, the Court determined that the Board was
required to use at least a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
The Court next looked to what standard of proof the Board employed. Noting a lack of
evidence the Board used a lower standard, the Court held that the Board did apply a
preponderance standard and “did not err in finding that appellants committed violations
warranting professional discipline.”
Finally, based on its finding that the Board used the correct standard of proof, the Court
dismissed the appellants’ equal protection argument as moot, noting medical physicians also use
a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof for disciplinary hearings. 12
Conclusion
NRS 233B.135 provides a standard for judicial review, not a standard of proof. In the
absence of a specific statutory mandate for standard of proof, state agencies in adjudicative
hearings must use at least the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.135(3)(e), (f).
Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. __, __, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013).
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Id.
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 233B.135(3)(e) states that the “court may remand or affirm the final decision or set it aside in
whole or in part . . . because the final decision of the agency is: . . . [c]learly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative and substantial evidence on the whole record.”
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See Gilman v. State Bd. Of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs, 120 Nev. 263, 274, 89 P.3d 1000, 1008 (2004).
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